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1. Introducation
The right to withdraw from the European Union has been the object of  a 
timeless quarrel. Some authors that stressed the supranational features of  the 
European Union argued that any hypothetical right to withdraw was incompatible 
with the permanent and irreversible character of  European integration, as reproduced 
in the general structure and in the specific provisions of  the Treaties.1 The fact that 
the Treaties were concluded for an “unlimited period”2 was widely thought to exclude 
the right of  unilateral withdrawal.
In its Opinion 1/91, the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (hereinafter, 
CJEU) clarified that apart from other International Agreements which merely create 
reciprocal rights and obligations and do not stipulate for a transfer of  sovereign 
rights; “the EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of  an international agreement, none the less 
constitutes the constitutional charter of  a Community based on the rule of  law”.3  
In this context, the TEU has a dual legal character: it is an International Agreement 
in origin and, at the same time, a constitutional charter, which brings us to the conclusion 
that the European Union is a new and unique entity of  International law. 
And this duality implies that the interpretation of  the European Treaties is 
governed, not only by European Union law, but also by International law namely the 
law of  treaties.
Accordingly, some authors that were aware of  the International law origins of  the 
European Union accepted the possibility of  withdrawal on the basis of  the relevant 
rules of  International law, but above all by common agreement of  all Member States, 
as anticipated in Article 54 (b) of  the Vienna Convention on the Law of  the Treaties 
1969.4
The German Federal Constitutional Court, in its decision on the ratification of  
the Maastricht Treaty 1992, anticipated the possibility of  a Member State to withdraw 
from the Treaties even by way of  a unilateral act.5 
The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, that never came into 
force (the Draft Constitutional Treaty), recognized for the first time the power of  a 
Member State to withdraw from the European Union.
However, as Article 59 of  the Draft European Constitution demonstrates, this 
power was not an immediate or absolute one.6 Even though it was often said that 
Article 59 was quickly and not carefully drafted, the drafting process shows that it 
was extensively discussed. Proof  of  that is the fact that the text of  the provision was 
changed substantially from the first7 to the final draft of  the Constitution.8 
1 John A. Hill, “The European Economic Community: The Right of  Member State Withdrawal”, 
Georgia Journal of  International and Comparative Law 12 (1982): 354. 
2 Both Articles 356 TFEU and 53 TEU state that the Treaties are “concluded for an unlimited period”. 
3 Opinion of  the Court of  Justice of  14 December 1991 delivered pursuant to the second 
subparagraph of  Article 228 (1) of  the Treaty- ECLI: EU:C:1991:490 [21]. 
4 See Sara Berglund, “Prison or Voluntary Cooperation? The Possibility of  Withdrawal from the 
European Union”, Scandinavian Political Studies 29 (June 2006): 150. 
5 Maastricht, BVerfGE 89, 155, page 190. 
6 See Raymond J. Friel, “Providing a Constitutional framework for withdrawal from the EU: Article 
59 of  the Draft European Constitution”, ICLQ 53 (2004): 425. 
7 See European Convention “Document from the Praesidium: Preliminary Draft Constitutional 
Treaty”, 28.10.02, CONV 369/02. 
8 See European Convention, “Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”, 18.07.2003, 
CONV 850/03. 
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Thus, while the first draft did not contain any limitations on the withdrawing 
State’s re-accession to the Union, two important provisions were added in the 
Constitution’s final draft: first, that the two-year period for the negotiations could 
only be extended by unanimity, and second, that a Member State that decides to 
withdraw from the European Union would need to make a new application for 
accession should it wish to re-join the Union in the future. 
It is interesting to note that the Praesidium considered that the right to withdraw 
from the European Union existed, even in the absence of  an explicit provision to 
that effect, and could not be made conditional upon the conclusion of  a withdrawal 
agreement. 
Nevertheless, an agreement made between the Union and the Member State is 
always encouraged and the withdraw provision takes effect, in any event, two years 
after notification, not being in itself  an obstacle for the withdrawal.
This Constitution’s withdrawal clause was adopted a few years later and without 
any relevant changes by the Lisbon Intergovernmental Conference, becoming Article 
50 TEU.9 
Article 50 has produced considerable academic interest, mostly since the United 
Kingdom voted in favour of  leaving the European Union, a vote that precipitated 
its first ever activation. And as we will see ahead, the withdrawal process has been 
under intense scrutiny from the perspective of  the United Kingdom’s constitutional 
lawyers. 
On 29th March 2017, the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Theresa May, has 
submitted notice to the President of  the European Council, Donald Tusk, that her 
Country would be leaving the European Union under Article 50 TEU. 
And once Article 50 TEU is triggered, the law of  the European Union governs 
the withdrawal process, because only the decision to depart is taken in accordance 
with the Member State’s domestic law, whereas EU law governs the departure itself. 
And despite its rapid rise to fame following the 23 June 2016 referendum on 
British membership of  the European Union, this sparsely worded provision raises 
more questions than answers. The withdrawal needs to be compliant with European 
Union constitutional law if  the European Union is to preserve its character as a 
supranational order that creates rights and obligations for institutions, Member 
States and private persons.
Further, it should be borne in mind that the European Union’s institutions and 
its Member States have limited instruments at their disposal to force other Member 
State to remain a member of  the Union against its will,10 therefore if  exit cannot be 
prevented, at least it can be regulated.
2. The notification to leave the European Union in perspective
Pursuant to Article 50 of  the TEU,11 the withdrawal process begins when a 
9 Christophe Hillion, “Leaving the European Union, the Union way - a legal analysis of  Article 50 
TEU”, Swedish Institute for European Policy Analysis (August 2016):1-12. 
10 T.C. Hartley, Constitutional Problems of  the European Union, (Oxford: Hart,1999),164–165. 
11 Article 50 TUE provides as follows: “1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in 
accordance with its own constitutional requirements. 2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the 
European Council of  its intention. In the light of  the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall 
negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account 
of  the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with 
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Member State, having “decide[d] to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own 
constitutional requirements”, notifies the European Council “of  its intention”. 
In fact, the authority of  domestic constitutional requirements is based on the 
assumption that they conform to the general requirements of  European Union 
Constitutional law, and particularly to the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU.12 
Consequently, formal compliance with domestic constitutional requirements 
might not be sufficient to validate the initial withdrawal decision under Article 50 
TEU if  the correctness of  such requirements is in doubt in relation to the respect 
of  the EU standards. 
Of  course, the European Union would have no interest in preventing a Member 
State’s departure if  the latter’s constitutional evolution disrespects the requirements 
of  European Union membership, quite the contrary. Thus, Article 50(1) TEU 
provides the ability of  Member States to withdraw from the EU legal order, but the 
success of  any exit initiative depends not only on the Member’s intention, but also 
on the fulfilment of  the procedural and substantive requirements of  Article 50 TEU, 
and on compliance with the rules and principles supporting the European Union 
legal order and that are under the control of  the European Court of  Justice.
If  the notification were to be submitted without adequate legal authority, the 
European Council would arguably have to pause and wait for the CJEU’s judgment, 
and/or obtain clarification of  the validity of  that notification before formally 
acknowledging receipt. 
Moreover, Article 50 TEU stipulates that the notification has to come from the 
withdrawing State and must be submitted to the European Council. 
It is important to acknowledge that Article 50 imposes only a few substantive 
and procedural conditions on the withdrawing Member State. Once it has given notice 
under Article 50(1) TEU in accordance with its own constitutional requirements, all 
that the withdrawing Member State is required to do, before the Treaties cease to 
apply, is to wait out the two-year period stipulated in Article 50(2) TEU.13 
Consequently, it is not required to justify its decision to leave, nor does Article 
50(2) TEU impose a duty upon it to negotiate and conclude a withdrawal agreement 
with the Union.14  
At the most, the withdrawing Member State may be under an implied duty to 
Article 218(3) of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf  of  the 
Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of  the European Parliament. 3. The 
Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of  entry into force of  the withdrawal agreement 
or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement 
with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period. 4. For the purposes of  paragraphs 2 
and 3, the member of  the European Council or of  the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not 
participate in the discussions of  the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it. A qualified majority 
shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union.5. If  
a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in 
Article 49.” 
12 See Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, Comentário ao Artigo 2.º, Tratado de Lisboa – Anotado e 
Comentado (Coimbra: Almedina, 2012), 27-29.  
13 A. Tatham, “‘Don’t Mention Divorce at the Wedding, Darling!’ EU Accession and Withdrawal 
after Lisbon”,in EU Law after Lisbon, ed. A. Biondi, P. Eeckhout and S. Ripley (Oxford: Oxford 
University 2012), 152. 
14 Maria Luísa Duarte talks about the existence of  a “fundamental right to leave the European Union” 
in “A constituição europeia e os direitos de soberania dos Estados-Membros – elementos de um 
aparente paradoxo”, O Direito 137 (2005, Vol. IV-V): 837 and seq. 
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negotiate such an agreement pursuant to the principle of  Sincere Cooperation, but 
this principle certainly does not oblige it to actually conclude an agreement.
Furthermore, nothing in the clause specifies its form or the timing, thus 
seemingly allowing the departing State discretion in this regard. But the discretion as 
to the timing for activating Article 50 TEU should not be unlimited,15 particularly in 
view of  the principle of  Sincere Cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU.16 
In this circumstance, a Member State should not be allowed to use the exit 
threat to increase its negotiating leverage or to strengthen its future negotiating 
position, with clear prejudice to the functioning of  the European Union.
Providing that this is the formal step that activates the whole exit procedure, 
the notification should be clear and there should be an unequivocal message from 
the State concerned that it intends to leave the European Union following an internal 
decision adopted to that effect.
It is important to notice that the notification, in itself, does not have a terminating 
effect, as made clear in Article 50(3) TEU which states that “the Treaties shall cease to 
apply to the State in question from the date of  entry into force of  the withdrawal agreement or, 
failing that, two years after the notification (…), unless the European Council, in agreement with 
the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period”. 
The notification still has immediate legal implications, as paragraph four 
stipulates that for the purpose of  Article 50 (2) and (3) TEU, “the member of  the European 
Council or of  the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the 
discussions of  the European Council or Council or in European decisions concerning it”.
This suspension is understandable, considering the involvement of  the 
European Council and of  the Council in the withdrawal process: the European 
Council determines the guidelines for negotiating the withdrawal agreement with the 
State concerned, while the Council concludes the referred agreement.
Some authors argue that this suspension should be extended to all the withdrawing 
State representatives at the other EU institutions, such as the Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Court.17 Still, I believe that the solution enshrined in 
the Treaty is a more reasonable one.
But until the notification is formally and clearly submitted, and for so long 
as the Member State continues to fulfil all its membership obligations under the 
Treaties, the withdrawal process will not start.
Following the orientations of  the European Council, the European Union 
agrees on the guidelines for negotiating an agreement with the State concerned, 
which is to be decided by the Council, by qualified majority, with the agreement of  
the European Parliament. 
15 The Heads of  State or Government of  the 27 European Union Member States pointed this out 
after the United Kingdom 2016 referendum, in the informal meeting that took place in Brussels, on 
the 29 June 2016, clarifying that while it was up to the British government to notify the European 
Council of  the UK’s intention to withdraw from the Union, this notification “should be done as quickly 
as possible [and] [t]here can be no negotiations of  any kind before this notification has taken place”. 
16 Alessandra Silveira sustains that “the doubts raised by Article 50 of  the TEU must be solved in accordance 
with the principles of  the EU law, in special the principle of  loyalty [Article 4(3) of  the TEU]”, or principle 
of  sincere cooperation, in “Brexit e o princípio federativo da lealdade europeia: considerações sobre o 
artigo 50.º do Tratado da União Europeia”, UNIO E-book Volume I Workshops CEDU (2016): 
331 et seq; about the principle of  sincere cooperation see Fausto de Quadros comment to Article 
4(3) TEU, in Tratado de Lisboa – anotado e comentado (Coimbra: Almedina, 2012), 35.
17 See Michael Dougan, “The Treaty of  Lisbon 2007: Winning minds, not hearts” Common Market 
Law Review, vol. 45, n. 3 (2008): 617-703.
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Also, the agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) 
TFEU, that states as follows: “The Commission, or the High Representative of  the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, where the agreement envisaged relates exclusively or principally 
to the common foreign and security policy, shall submit recommendations to the Council, which 
shall adopt a decision authorising the opening of  negotiations and, depending on the subject of  the 
agreement envisaged, nominating the Union negotiator or the head of  the Union’s negotiating team”.
In fact, Article 50 TEU does not require a negotiated departure,18 and the 
negotiation only depends on the withdrawing state’s willingness to discuss. Until 
effective departure, the Member State remains bound by the obligation of  sincere 
cooperation and therefore to the duty to help the Union carry out its responsibilities, 
including that of  negotiating an agreement.
It is also foreseen that should the former Member State intend to re-join the 
Union, it would have to apply on the basis of  Article 49 TEU.
3. Can a notification under Article 50 TEU be withdrawn?
One thing is clear: Article 50 TEU remains soundless as to whether the 
withdrawing Member State may retract its notification to leave. 
But how can we interpret this silence (among others) of  Article 50 TEU? 
On the one hand, paragraph 3 foresees that “the Treaties shall cease to apply to the 
State in question from the date of  entry into force of  the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two 
years after the notification (...), unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State 
concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period”. 
To start, we could interpret this provision in the sense that once the notification 
is given, there is no turning back and the Treaties will cease to apply to the State 
concerned, either upon the entry into force of  the withdrawal agreement, or at the 
end of  the two year period triggered by the notification, with the only possible change 
in the process being that the European Council and the Member State concerned 
change the time upon which the Treaties cease to apply, but not the withdrawal itself. 
This interpretation would probably prevent a Member State from mistreating 
the procedure to find out what exit terms it could achieve whilst retaining the 
assurance of  full membership if  displeased with those terms. 
In this context, the Miller Case19 concluded two things: first, a notice under 
Article 50(2) TEU cannot be withdrawn once it is given, and second, Article 50 TEU 
does not allow for a conditional notice to be given. 
Lord Pannick sustained clearly that Article 50 TEU must exclude the right to 
retract a notification to leave because it makes “no mention of  a power to withdraw”.20  
However, a different interpretation of  this provision would allow the 
withdrawing Member State the possibility of  holding up the withdrawal process 
following a sincere change of  position of  the State concerned.  And in that case, the 
European Council and the Member State could extend the period long enough to 
establish the re-engagement within the integration process.
In fact, it is this last interpretation of  Article 50 TEU that is more in accordance 
with the nature of  the reasoning method that implies reading terms in the text where 
18 Defending a unilateral right to exit the Union, see Hannes Hofmeister, “Should I Stay or Should I 
Go? – A Critical Analysis of  the Right to Withdraw From the EU”, European Law Journal 16, Issue 5 
(September 2010): 589-592. 
19 R (Miller) v. The Secretary of  State for Exiting the European Union (2016) EWHC 2768 (Admin). 
20 Transcript dated of  13 October 2016, p.16. 
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they are absent. Reasoning by implication is a well-established method of  legal 
interpretation in general, and of  European law more specifically. 
We must remember that the CJEU has always employed this technique in its 
jurisprudence, a notable example being its ruling on the initial silence of  the Treaties 
on the subject of  fundamental rights and the Court activism in this matter.21
The CJEU has developed its own approach to the interpretation of  the founding 
Treaties, concentrating on the “spirit, the general scheme and the wording” of  the texts. 
And as the Court sustained in the CILFIT judgement, “every provision of  Community 
law must be placed in its context and interpreted in the light of  the provisions of  Community law as 
a whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof  and to its state of  evolution at the date on which the 
provision in question is to be applied.”22  
But Lord Pannick also argued that “the very possibility of  a power to withdraw a 
notification would frustrate (…) Article 50(3), which sets out in the clearest possible terms, what 
the consequences are of  giving the notification under Article 50(2).”
However I find in these assumptions the following difficulties.
First, Article 50(3) TEU provides that the withdrawal becomes effective two 
years after the notification to leave was given, should a withdrawal agreement not 
occur before that date. However, the European Council, acting with the agreement 
of  the remaining Member States and the withdrawing Member State, may extend the 
two-year period indefinitely. In this case, the procedure laid down in Article 50(3) 
TEU does not have to end in the Member State’s departure from the Union.
Second, contrary to what Lord Pannick pontificates, a power to revoke the 
notification would not frustrate the legal consequences provided by Article 50(3) 
TEU, since the only legal consequence that this Article imposes on the withdrawing 
Member State is this two-year delay before its notification takes effect. So the only 
thing that a power to revoke would frustrate is the withdrawal notification itself. 
Additionally, we should note that the Supreme Court was not bound to decide 
on a point of  European Union law, ex proprio motu here the parties have excluded 
that point from the scope of  their dispute. Nor it was the Supreme Court bound to 
refer a question of  European Union law to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling under 
Article 267 TFEU, when that question had no bearing on the outcome of  the case 
submitted before it.
Hence, it is rather questionable whether the Supreme Court should have 
ruled alone that a withdrawal notice made under Article 50 TEU was irrevocable 
when ultimately, it is for the Court of  Justice of  the European Union to provide an 
authoritative interpretation of  Article 50 TEU. 
But proceedings have been initiated before the Irish Courts to obtain such 
a ruling by way of  the Preliminary Reference Procedure. The proceedings pursue 
a referral to the CJEU on the question of  whether the British government can 
unilaterally revoke Article 50 TEU once triggered, without the consent of  all other 
27 Member States. If  a reference is really made to the CJEU, we will have the answer 
to the central question of  this article.
Still, we cannot find legal barriers that would prevent a State from withdrawing 
21 About this activism, see Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of  EU Law, (Oxford: University 
Press, 2005), 298 et seq. 
22 Judgment of  the Court of  6 October 1982, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of  
Health, Case 283/81, ECLI: EU:C:1982:335, at 20. 
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a notification under Article 50 TEU.23 But I must admit that there is not, in the 
present context, an institutional or judicial precedent to guide the interpretation of  
Article 50 TEU and the provision is silent in this respect. 
Nonetheless, while Article 50 TEU does not offer an express provision about 
reversing a withdrawal notification, it does not mean that it is excluding the possibility 
that such a power may be implied, or that this power could derive from general 
International law with the condition that it is compatible with the Treaties. 
The preparatory work of  the intergovernmental conference that drew up the 
Treaty of  Lisbon is not in the public domain but Article 50 TEU reproduces Article 
59 of  the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe prepared by the 
European Convention. 
The negotiating history of  Article 59 shows that the right to withdraw from the 
Union was intended to be unilateral in character and the amendments endeavouring 
to bond this right to substantive conditions or to the successful conclusion of  a 
withdrawal agreement were excluded.
The Praesidium of  the European Convention explained that “it was felt that such an 
agreement should not constitute a condition for withdrawal so as not to void the concept of  voluntary 
withdrawal of  its substance”,24 and recalled that; “procedure laid down in this provision draws 
on the procedure in the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties”.25 
Having in attention these preparatory work conclusions, as well as the Vienna 
Convention of  the Law of  Treaties 1969, I can only conclude that Article 50 TEU 
was intended to clearly recognise that the Member States have a unilateral right26 to 
withdraw from the Treaties and to regulate the procedure governing the exercise of  
this right. 
Further, I cannot find evidence in the preparatory work conclusions to support 
the view that Article 50 TEU was intentionally drafted to exclude the right of  a 
Member State to reverse its withdrawal notification. 
Denying this right to the Member States not only contradicts the intentions 
of  the Treaty drafters but also their understanding that Article 50 TEU draws upon 
the procedure set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of  the Treaties, namely 
Article 68 of  this Convention.
Last but not least, these conclusions may raise procedural questions, namely, 
if  there are any formal requirements that a Member State that intends to rescind its 
withdrawal notification must comply with. 
Annulling a withdrawal notification is a formal Treaty act so it should be 
submitted in written form, just like the original notification itself. 
Additionally, a withdrawing Member State doesn’t have to justify the decision to 
leave the Union, so it should not have to justify its decision to revoke the withdrawal 
notification as well. 
But having in consideration the principle of  Sincere Cooperation, the 
withdrawing Member State should give some explanation regarding its decision, 
and the notice should be addressed to the European Council in its capacity as the 
recipient of  the original notification under Article 50(2) TEU.
23 See Paul Craig, “Brexit: A Drama in Six Acts”, European Law Review 41 (2016, 447): 464–465; and 
Takis Tridimas, “Article 50: An Endgame without an End?”, King’s Law Journal 27 (2016): 303–305. 
24 Praesidium, Title X: Union Membership, CONV 648/03 (2 April 2003), page 9. 
25 Praesidium, Title X: Union Membership (2 April 2003), page 9. 
26 Takis Tridimas, “Article 50: an endgame without an end”, 301. 
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In conclusion, the existence of  this right to withdraw a notification submitted 
under Article 50 TEU is a matter of  law, detached from political considerations. 
However, Member States that decide to trigger Article 50 TEU are always subject 
to the European Union law, and particularly to the principle of  Sincere Cooperation 
that incorporates the principle of  good faith.
There is no doubt that the withdrawal process disturbs the normal functioning 
of  the European Union and it is an obligation of  the withdrawing Member State to 
“facilitate the achievement of  the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise 
the attainment of  the Union’s objectives”, as stated in Article 4(3) TEU. Consequently, if  
a Member State fails to comply with these principles using Article 50 TEU in an 
abusive way, it may open itself  up to infringement proceedings under Article 258 
TFEU.
4. Conclusion
To deny a Member State the right to revoke its unilateral decision to leave the 
European Union would be constitutionally incongruous and the European Union 
should accept a bona fide revocation of  a notification within the two-year timeframe. 
If  it occurs, its consequence is immediately halting the Article 50 clock.
The constitutional questions at stake in the process of  withdrawing from the 
European Union are of  the utmost importance for the Union’s construction. 
And it is the commitment to constitutional values that distinguishes the 
European Union from other international supranational organisations. These values 
will be put to the test during Brexit and other exits that might occur in the future.
But I believe that the recognition of  a right to leave, as well as the respect for 
a right to stay, or to conscious return, can contribute to the pursuit of  an “ever closer 
union among the peoples of  Europe”, precisely by making it possible for a State to step out 
of  (or to conscious step back in), rather than hold up a further integration process. 
